This paper provides an explanation for the observed persistence in income inequality across households in terms limited parental altruism. We postulate that the degree of parental altruism is 'limited' by the financial status of the parent. A poor parent not only has less ability, but also has less concern about children's welfare. This generates a non-linearity in the human capital formation for poor vis-à-vis rich households. With a constant returns to scale technology for human capital formation it implies that initial income differences may perpetuate over time. We also derive the conclusion that the initial distribution of income is important for long run growth -a conclusion that conforms to some of the recent works in this field, notably that of Galor and Zeira.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the endogenous growth literature has shed new light on issues pertaining to income distribution, human capital formation, intergenerational mobility and growth. In two influential papers, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) have argued that inequality in income distribution might persist in the long run in the presence of credit market imperfection and some form of indivisibility in the human capital formation technology, and this would have a negative impact on the long run growth scenario. In an unequal society, credit market imperfection leads to unequal opportunities to invest in the short run -resulting in polarization, and the polarization is perpetuated in the long run due to the assumed indivisibility in the investment technology. A variety of models have subsequently been developed which essentially follow a similar line of argument, e.g., Freeman (1996) , Aghion and Bolton (1997) , Picketty (1997) , Maoz and Moav (1999) . A somewhat different explanation has been put forward by Benabou (1994) and Durlauf (1996) , who stress the importance of location-specific factors (local human capital externalities, opportunities of local finance as well as other local economic and sociological effects).
The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative theory explaining the persistence of income inequality -an explanation based on human capital formation and parental preferences. We argue that in any family the human capital formation decisions affecting the next generation (e.g., how much to investment in children's schooling, health care etc.) are typically undertaken by the parents. Therefore the degree of parental altruism plays an important role in determining the future earning abilities of the children. The crucial assumption of our paper is that the degree of parental altruism is not exogenous; it depends on the earning ability (and the educational status) of the parent herself. A poor parent will feel less altruistic towards her children than her rich counterpart. As a result, not only does she have less ability to invest in children's human capital formation, but also has less willingness -a factor that contributes significantly to the perpetuation of lower earning abilities generation after generation. In the context of human capital formation, growth and distribution, the education system plays an important role. This issue was first addressed by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) who had analyzed the relative merits and demerits of the public education system in a standard overlapping generations model with human capital formation. This issue assumes special significance in the context of our model: given that poor parent are less concerned about their children's welfare, and therefore at the margin are less willing to incur expenditure on children's education, in a poor economy characterized by high inequality in skill and income distribution, would public education system perform better than private education system in terms of growth?
Secondly, would such a public education policy be necessarily welfare improving for the majority of the population? In order to address these issues, we consider an alternative structure incorporating a public education system which is financed by a uniform proportional income tax. As in Glomm and Ravikumar, we assume that the tax rate is decided by majority voting. We derive the condition under which the public education system performs better than the private education system in terms of long run growth. The performance of the public education system is positively related to the degree of inequality in the economy. In an economy characterized by extreme inequality, not only will the public education system perform better than the private education regime in terms of growth, but it will also be the preferred educational system, chosen by the majority.
The paper is organized as follows. We lay out the basic structure of the economy in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the intergenerational mobility across households. Questions pertaining to initial distribution of income and growth has been analysed in Section 4. In Section 5 we compare the relative merits an demerits of the public education system vis-à-vis the private education system in this context. Section 6 offers the final comments and conclusion.
THE MODEL
We consider a small open economy producing a single commodity that can be used either as consumption good or as investment good.
PRODUCTION

Technology
There are two technologies that can be used to produce the final good -a modern technology that requires capital and skilled labour as inputs, and a traditional technology that requires unskilled labour alone. The production technology in the modern sector is represented by a continuous, concave, and CRS technology of the following kind:
where A Y is the output produced in the modern sector and K and H are the amount of capital and skilled labour used in the modern sector respectively.
The production technology in the traditional sector is given by:
where B Y is the output produced in the traditional sector; L is the amount of unskilled labour used in the traditional sector, and w is the fixed marginal product of labour in the traditional sector.
Factor Prices
The small open economy assumption implies that the domestic rate of return on capital is equal to the given foreign rate of interest * r . This fixes the capital-skilled labour ratio in the modern sector, which in turn fixes wage rate of the skilled labour, say at * w . The return to labour in the traditional sector is given by the constant marginal product of labour in this sector, namely w , which is strictly less than * w .
The goods market and the labour markets are perfectly competitive and there is full employment of all factors of production.
HOUSEHOLDS
We consider an overlapping generations structure. At any point of time, there are N families in the economy, each consisting of one young member, one old member and one child. Each individual is born with an endowment of one unit unskilled labour and lives for three periods.
In the first period as a child she consumes a fixed amount (out of her parent's income) and acquires some skill, the skill level being a function of the amount of investment made by her parent on her education (or human capital formation). In the second period of her life she chooses to work either in the modern sector or in the traditional sector depending on her skill level; and takes decisions about consumption, savings and investment in children's education on the basis of an optimisation exercise.
In the third period she is retired and lives of the returns from savings made in the previous period. She dies at the end of this period.
Generation t denotes the set of young people at period t .
For simplicity, we assume that people consume nothing as child and when young; they consume only at the old age. Thus out of their income when young, they invest a part in children's human capital formation; the rest they invest in the capital market earning an interest income * r in the next period (when old). This they consume entirely in the next period along with the principal.
Preferences
Individuals derive utility from own old-age consumption as well as from the investment made in children's' education. That expenditure incurred on children's education gives them utility implies the presence of 'warm glow' kind of altruism.
However we assume that the degree of altruism is positively related to their income level. This fact is captured by attaching a weight δ to the utility derived from children's education expenditure, the weight being positively related to the own (oldage) consumption of an individual. Thus the utility function of the representative agent of the t -th generation is given by:
where t c denotes her old-age consumption and t b denotes the amount invested in children's education.
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The following assumptions characterizes the u and δ functions:
The above assumptions ensure that the preference function ) , ( b c W is monotonic and quasi-concave.
Income
The representative individual, when young, earns a wage income t y . Out of this income she spends t b amount in children's education, and save and invest the other part, t s , in the capital market. In the next period she earns an income t s r ) 1 ( * + , which she consumes entirely. Thus her budget constraint is given by 3 Since people consume only once -in the last period of their life, we can denote the old-age consumption simply by t c , without specifying any additional subscript or superscript.
The households maximizes (3) subject to the budget constraint given in (4).
The income of the representative agent of generation t depends on whether she works in the traditional sector or the modern sector. If she works in the traditional sector she earns a fixed wage income w . If she works in the moderns sector she earns a wage 
However, there is a finite upper bound h to the skill level that can be acquired through investment in education, such that
The skill level of an individual fully determines her income and therefore her decisions as to how much to consume and how much to invest in her children's 
The amount of skilled labour employed in any period is given by
On the other hand the number of people working in the traditional sector is given by
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
The intergenerational mobility of the representative household is determined by the human capital formation technology given in (7). Note that the investment in education t b can be obtained by solving the optimisation problem of the households.
From the first order conditions: 
From (11) and (12), the expenditure on children's education can be expressed as a function of the income level y . By implicit function theorem it can be shown that
Thus intergenerational mobility is determined by the following dynamic equation: Lemma 1 provides a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria for the complete dynamic system (9) that characterizes the intergenerational mobility of a particular household. Figure 1 below From the above proposition it is evident that intergenerational mobility depends crucially on the initial skill level of the young member of the households. All those households which start with an initial skill level lying below the critical value ĥ will in the long run end up in the traditional sector earning a lower income than those households which start with a skill level above the critical value and thus ending up in the modern sector in the long run. Interestingly, even if a family works in the modern sector to begin with, it may eventually move to the traditional sector if its initial skill level is not high enough.
In order to convince the reader that the dynamics described in Proposition 1 is indeed a possibility under reasonable assumptions about the utility function, an example might be appropriate here.
Example: Let the utility function of the representative member of generation t be ( )
In terms of the general utility function defined in ( Note that the Galor and Zeira result is replicated here essentially because in both the cases there is complete polarization of income in the long run depending on whether the initial skill level (or as in the Galor-Zeira case, the initial wealth level) lies above or below a critical minimum value. However, in our case this critical value ĥ is endogenously determined, whereas in Galor-Zeira it is exogenous -arising due to the assumed indivisibility in human capital investment. Also unlike Galor and Zeira, capital market imperfection plays no role in our model. Poor households can borrow from the market at the same interest rate as the rich households; so it is not a higher cost of borrowing that restricts the investment in human capital formation by the poor households. The poor households simply choose to invest less in children's human capital formation because they are more concerned about their own consumption.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH
Educating children is a luxury that the households can ill-afford when poor.
PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM
In our analysis so far we have assumed that each parent finances education of her children privately. In this section we discuss the consequence of introducing a public education system which is financed by a proportional income tax.
Suppose the government imposes a proportional income tax at the rate τ on the young members of the households and invests the entire taxed amount on a public education programme. The individual households do not have the option of pursuing an independent private education program. It follows trivially that when the initial distribution of skill is uniform across the households such that everybody has identical skill level and identical income (which is also the average income of the economy), the tax rate chosen under majority voting will coincide with the proportion of income spent on children's education under the private education regime. Hence the investment in human capital formation per child will be exactly the same under the private and the public education system, and the long run growth path will also be identical. The public education system will generate a different growth path for the economy than the private education system if and only if the initial distribution is not uniform.
In every period the young generation of that period vote to decide the tax rate and the tax rate chosen by the majority is accepted by the government. In this case the households' decision-making is
If the public education system is introduced at time 0, then the initial expenditure on education is given by
Hence e ducation expenditure per child under public education system is, One important implication of the public education system is that it removes the difference in the skill level across households from the next period onwards. Thus the first round impact of the public education system would determine the subsequent pattern of development for the entire economy. Proposition 2. An economy will be better off in the long run under public education system in the sense that it will attain a higher level of per capita income compared to its initial position if the chosen tax rate is such that
It is easy to see that if
Moreover, under this condition the public education system will perform better than the private education system in terms of long run growth provided there is at least one household in the economy with initial skill level below ĥ . 
Maximizing Ŵ with respect to τ we can derive the optimal tax rate for the household as,
The optimal tax rate here is independent of the household's own initial income and will therefore be identical for all households. 4 Thus from Proposition 2, the economy will be better off in the long run under the public education system if the initial distribution is such that the average income satisfies the following condition: 
The only difference (28) and (29) 
